The Gaming Den

mean_liar wrote:

cthulhu wrote:You're confusing doctrine for other issues.

What you wrote looks like a criticism of doctrine to me. What am I missing?

I think I meant to write something completely different there, like 'you're not looking at doctrinal causes for other symptoms' - and then the issues are being ascribed to those symptoms rather than the underlying flaws. Suggesting that the french beef up their defenses here just means weakening the units in Belgium where the fortifications were poor and the french did not have a great opportunity to occupy them before the Germans got there.

Like, the enter french defensive strategy was built around their defensive doctrine of a static defence. This caused all the issues Zinegata is getting at.

Technical point: The Maginot line extended through the Ardennes and was manned. It wasn't that the french didn't defend this sector. It was lightly defended, but the fortifications and field works in this sector were the strongest. It was entirely reasonable to use your weakest units where the fortifications were the strongest - but it was certainly defended against German attacks. That wasn't the issue.

The issue was the the french doctrine and resulting force composition could not deal with a breakthrough once it happened. Three strategies were used during the war to counter the german breakthroughs, and all rely on launching a counter attack. They did not

A) Have a strong mobile reserve (The German response to breakthrough attacks)
B) Have a sufficient artillery (The US response to breakthrough attacks); or
C) Mount a defence in depth (The soviet response to breakthrough attacks.

The static defensive doctrine could not deal the fluid situation that evolved if the Germans broke through anywhere, nor did they have the mobility to rapidly redeploy and secure the Belgian fortifications.

Overall it was a massive cock up along the lines, not just in the Ardennes - and if the Germans broke through anywhere the french were dead as they literally could no respond to a breakthrough. I'm not alone in this opinion either, the french high command explicitly came to this conclusion in 1938 (Conclusion being that french doctrine and resulting force ToE, Training and C4C was unable to cope with mobile breakthrough warfare), but decided to persist with the static defense doctrine anyway because they could not change in time before they projected a major conflict.

The Russians were trained to do whatever Stalin fancied - which generally involved "Not One Step Back"!

This decision had nothing to do with Stalin (well, it did in directly, the mobile warfare proponents had lost political ascendancy for a long time within the soviet high command, and the 'no step back' bit happened AFTER the soviets were ALREADY fucked) - Soviet military doctrine had changed dramatically in the 30s, and had produced an infantry centric static defence doctrine that was totally unworkable vs blitzkrieg tactics - but the Soviet army had adapted to follow that pattern.

The soviets had broken their ToE and logistics services and thus were unable to respond. There was no possible deployment of the soviet forces as they stood at the start of barbarossa that would hold off the germans because you couldn't muster enough mobile reserves or artillery in theatre.

But anyway, it's also probable that Stalin was going to attack the germans which is why the deployment, but that's another discussion.

Just to round out my point - the 1 rifle per two men thing never happened as far as we know, certainly there is a shortage of historical accounts. In the scenarios where it is pictured as happening in subsequent media (say, in enemy at the gates) the units coming in were actually well trained and equipped units with at or above ToE strength.

The soviets actually had great equipment at the squad level, and the number of SMG platoons only ramped up over the war.

cthulhu wrote:Like, the enter french defensive strategy was built around their defensive doctrine of a static defence. This caused all the issues Zinegata is getting at.

Technical point: The Maginot line extended through the Ardennes and was manned. It wasn't that the french didn't defend this sector. It was lightly defended, but the fortifications and field works in this sector were the strongest. It was entirely resonable to use your weakest units where the fortifications were the strongest - but it was certainly defended against German attacks. That wasn't the issue.

I'm not denying static defense was a major reason for French defeat. What I'm contesting though, is that the idea that static defense could never have worked.

The Maginot line didn't extend through the entire Ardennes. Only part of it. If it did, it would be violating Belgian neutrality. In fact the whole reason why the French sent their mobile forces into Belgium is because the Maginot line couldn't be extended into Belgium.

For most of the battle, the only force opposing the main German advance in the Ardennes was French Cavalry and assorted Belgian units - both without the benefit of fortifications. They did very, very badly.

What you mean is that the French had substantial defenses at Sedan and the Meuse river, which was sort of the "end" of the Maginot line in the north. Sedan did fall much more quickly than the French anticipated (again, due to outstanding initiative and drive of the Panzer forces), but reinforcements were simply nowhere to be had anyway - the tank and mobile forces were all already far to the north in Belgium, fighting massive tank battles against the Germans (i.e. Hannut) which they were generally winning.

The static defensive doctrine could not deal the fluid situation that evolved if the Germans broke through anywhere, nor did they have the mobility to rapidly redeploy and secure the Belgian fortifications. Overall it was a massive cock up along the lines, not just in the Ardennes

The problem with the static defense is that you need to anticipate where the enemy is attacking. If they attack where you expect, that's fine. But if they attack elsewhere, bad things happen, especially if you've already committed your reserves to an imagined threat.

It's worth noting the French - despite their "static defense doctrine", did in fact have a mobile reserve. That's the force that went into Belgium (because the Belgian border is one enormous hole in their static defense line), which was then cut off and forced to evacuate via Dunkirk.

Three strategies were used during the war to counter the german breakthroughs, and all rely on launching a counter attack. I'm not alone in this opinion either, the french high command explicitly came to this conclusion in 1938 (Conclusion being that french doctrine and resulting force ToE, Training and C4C was unable to cope with mobile breakthrough warfare), but decided to persist with the static defense doctrine anyway because they could not change in time.

Not really. Again, it's not just counter-attack. It's also contingent on the rest of the frontline holding its ground. Simply counter-attacking the head of the blitzkrieg while the rest of the front collapses earns you very little but lots of dead tanks on both sides (which happened time and time again in 1941, during Barbarossa.).

Kursk and The Bulge demonstrated how quickly a blitzkrieg force can bog down if the rest of the front line holds - simply because tanks also need gas and they're not gonna get it while the frontline is still shooting at the gas trucks trying to resupply the tanks.

It's also worth noting that the "counter attack" in many cases proved disastrous. When the Soviets counter-attacked during the battle of Kursk, the massive tank battle that resulted ended with a Soviet defeat. They lost the better part of a Tank Army in exchange for a small number of German tanks and "buying time".

This decision had nothing to do with Stalin (well, it did in directly, the mobile warfare proponents had lost political ascendancy for a long time within the soviet high command, and the 'no step back' bit happened AFTER the soviets were ALREADY fucked)

Stalin had insisted on holding every inch of Soviet ground well before "Not One Step Back!". Meaning huge bulges in the line had to be held rather than abandoned.

Just to round out my point - the 1 rifle per two men thing never happened as far as we know, certainly there is a shortage of historical accounts. In the scenarios where it is pictured as happening in subsequent media (say, in enemy at the gates) the units coming in were actually well trained and equipped units with at or above ToE strength.

Again, it depends on the unit category, location, and overall readiness. You can't have 80% of your tanks out of action due to mechanical troubles and not have similar fuck ups in the infantry arm.

A Moscow unit for instance can be relied upon to have a nearly complete set of kit. Others along the border however... a coin toss, especially those that were still in the process of being mustered/raised/reorganized.

I'm not denying static defense was a major reason for French defeat. What I'm contesting though, is that the idea that static defense could never have worked.

It could never have worked as per french doctrine.

The Maginot line didn't extend through the entire Ardennes. Only part of it. If it did, it would be violating Belgian neutrality. In fact the whole reason why the French sent their mobile forces into Belgium is because the Maginot line couldn't be extended into Belgium.

French planning called for occupying the Belgian fortifications which were integrated into the Maginot line - in places the works were physically connected. The 'mobile' forces were supposed to occupy the Belgian defensive works - they were not mobile in any tactical sense, they just had more strategic transport access.

For most of the battle, the only force opposing the main German advance in the Ardennes was French Cavalry and assorted Belgian units - both without the benefit of fortifications. They did very, very badly.

You're actually talking about the advance into Belgium plan part of the french doctrine. This is where they came very badly unstuck. They were, incidentally, supposed to have the benefit of fortification. A key failing identified with the french plan BEFORE the war was that there was a strong potential that they would be unable to occupy the fortifications before they were attacked. Which is what happened.

It's worth noting the French - despite their "static defense doctrine", did in fact have a mobile reserve. That's the force that went into Belgium (because the Belgian border is one enormous hole in their static defense line), which was then cut off and forced to evacuate via Dunkirk.

It wasn't a mobile reserve.

French military planning called for them to occupy the Belgian fortifications that linked into the Maginot line. What you call a reserve is actually the main defensive force that was intended to be committed to the prepared defensive position. This is not a reserve in any sense of the word.

Also, I'd be hard pressed to describe them as 'winning'

Not really. Again, it's not just counter-attack. It's also contingent on the rest of the frontline holding its ground. Simply counter-attacking the head of the blitzkrieg while the rest of the front collapses earns you very little but lots of dead tanks on both sides (which happened time and time again in 1941, during Barbarossa.).

You keep stating I am suggesting that I am saying you counter attack the head of the breakthrough. I have already corrected you once. Only US planning calls for a counter attack at the head of the breakthrough, and that's for reasons I will explain later.

Kursk and The Bulge demonstrated how quickly a blitzkrieg force can bog down if the rest of the front line holds - simply because tanks also need gas and they're not gonna get it while the frontline is still shooting at the gas trucks trying to resupply the tanks.

You are taking the wrong lessons from both battles. Kursh was classic defence in depth. It's even taught at the US Army staff college as an example of defense in depth. The battle of the bulge was just the US artillery doctrine that began at Anzio writ large. The US relied on stripping away infantry and logistics with a massive artillery assault, then crushing the isolated tankers with a combined arms attack. They did this over and over against attempted German breakthroughs at Anzio (more than 17 attacks were repulsed). At the battle of the bulge they fired more artillery shells in a month just a this battlefield than the Wehrmacht fired in the entire year prior (and a bit after to give a year long sample) across the entire western front in an attempt to achieve this objective.

Again, it depends on the unit category, location, and overall readiness. You can't have 80% of your tanks out of action due to mechanical troubles and not have similar fuck ups in the infantry arm.

Yes you can easily - because you don't have the same mechanical and logistical complexity in supplying a rifle division than a mechanized division or a armored division. The German army in Italy had 80% of their tanks out of action due to a combination or poor logistics from allied bombings and supply shortages, but their infantry units were fine, because they are much easier to maintain and supply.

Incidentally, this is why the Americans were so effective - they had 8:1 tank odds to begin with, then they had fantastic serviceability rates, so they had 20+:1 effective tank odds, meaning they could always attack where the german armoured forces were not. Combined with the unrivaled artillery cover in the US army, they had a massive edge thanks to logistics.

A Moscow unit for instance can be relied upon to have a nearly complete set of kit. Others along the border however... a coin toss, especially those that were still in the process of being mustered/raised/reorganized.

Equipment was never the issue in rifle divisions. It was poor logistics and command and control.